INTRODUCTION

Daseinsanalysis stands at a decisive threshold. Rooted in phenomenology and hermeneutics, it offers a unique understanding of human existence. And yet, its presence in contemporary scientific discourse remains marginal—not only because its mode of thinking does not conform to certain paradigmatic requirements, but also because many representatives of Daseinsanalysis have so far contributed too little to existing scientific dialogues. The responsibility does not lie solely with the ‘mainstream’, but also with shortcomings in training, methodological connectivity, and self-positioning. In many cases, the marginal role of Daseinsanalysis is less the result of ideological opposition than of practical deficits—such as insufficient education in scientific research, limited familiarity with academic standards, and a lack of publication activity. Those who do not enter the arena of discourse—or are not equipped to do so—cannot expect to be seen or heard.

Moreover, the very notion of “scientific discourse” deserves critical reflection. Science is not a uniform enterprise: it encompasses diverse cultures of inquiry—from the quantifying rigor of experimental methods to the interpretive depth of the humanities. In disciplines such as history, anthropology, and philosophy, objectivity is not measured in numbers, but in contextual insight and coherence. These domains already share affinities with Daseinsanalysis—through their commitment to meaning, situated understanding, and the human world in its lived complexity. The marginality of Daseinsanalysis, then, is not only a matter of ideological misfit, but of missed dialogue with those parts of science where it might naturally belong.

This conference explores a pressing challenge:

How can Daseinsanalysis engage in scientific discourse—without compromising its ontological foundations, and while actively contributing to interdisciplinary knowledge?

The task is not to invent a new science, but to learn the languages of existing ones—by engaging their frameworks, understanding their assumptions, and interpreting them in light of Daseinsanalysis. This requires scholarly training, conceptual clarity, and the willingness to enter scientific arenas with both openness and rigor.

Importantly, Daseinsanalysis was never anti-scientific. Neither Ludwig Binswanger, nor Medard Boss nor Martin Heidegger rejected science as such. Rather, they sought to question the unexamined assumptions of modern science—especially the reduction of the human being to objectivity, causality, and measurability. Heidegger was not an enemy of science but a critic of the prevailing, unreflected concept of it. He demanded that science become aware of its own ontological presuppositions. Boss, in turn, was a trained physician, analytically educated, and a university lecturer. He upheld high standards of professional and methodological seriousness. But for him, it was clear: science in the form of natural science alone is not sufficient to do justice to the human being.

What happened then? In practice, Daseinsanalysis as a whole developed a fundamentally skeptical stance toward empirical research, diagnostic systems, and methodological standardization. While this was motivated by a justified critique of reductionism, it was rarely accompanied by the development of a coherent alternative scientific framework. The emphasis on personal experience, phenomenology, and existential openness—though central—was often elevated to a position that left Daseinsanalysis disconnected from broader scientific dialogue and evidence-sensitive fields.

This was not in the spirit of Boss. He explicitly emphasized that Daseinsanalysis must prove itself within the scientific domain—albeit on the basis of a richer and more adequate conception of the human being. Avoiding mainstream standards is not enough. Without articulating how its own standards function and how they can be made communicable, Daseinsanalysis risks intellectual isolation.

Is that goal fulfilled today? No—at least not in its full scope. Daseinsanalysis continues to offer a valuable contribution to the field of therapy, yet it has not fully realized an alternative model of medicine or therapeutic practice grounded in Being—one that is both conceptually sound and empirically responsive. It often remains a niche movement, and its founding idea risks being diluted—caught between pure phenomenologism and disciplinary critique.

What would be in the spirit of the founders today? A contemporary project that truly honors the legacy of Heidegger, Binswanger and Boss would need to:

• connect the ontological understanding of the human being with empirical inquiry,

• operate across disciplines (philosophy, medicine, psychology, anthropology),

• practice a critical form of scientific responsibility that reflects on its epistemological foundations,

• treat therapy, research, and education as an integrated whole,

• remain open to new ways of understanding and helping—without falling into dogma or ideological

  closure.

This conference is a step in that direction: a space for critical reflection, for renewal, and for rearticulating the unique contribution Daseinsanalysis can make to the future of science, therapy, and the human self- understanding.